Separating Race and Party in Congressional Elections

Bernard L. Fraga*
Emory University

June 9, 2020

Abstract

Theories of race and representation suggest that the racial/ethnic group composing a majority of the electorate gains co-ethnic representation, contrasting with both observational evidence and party-based understandings of who gets elected to Congress. I reconcile these notions by examining the emergence and success of over 8,900 White, Black, Latinx, and Asian American congressional candidates from both the Democratic and Republican parties from 2006-2018. I find race plays a dominant role in determining who seeks office and who wins primary elections, and that incumbents are more likely to face a challenge from a non-co-ethnic when there is a "mismatch" between incumbent race and district demographics. Regardless of nominee race, however, partisanship determines general election outcomes. Using a regression discontinuity approach that leverages close primary elections, I find no evidence that minority candidates face a penalty after winning either party's nomination. These analyses clarify the distinct roles of race and party in producing contemporary election results, and outline the conditions necessary to advance representational equality.

In 2006, Harold Ford, Jr., a moderate African-American Democrat representing Tennessee's single majority-Black district, decided to run for Senate. While Ford lost that election, he was replaced in the House by Steve Cohen, who won office in a landslide. Cohen, a liberal White Democrat, has won by a wide margin in every subsequent general election, despite seeking office in the most heavily African-American district in the country.[1] In 2010, Tim Scott became the first Black Republican elected from South Carolina since reconstruction. Scott's district was 70% White, and four years later, he was elected to the Senate in a White-majority state. Gene Green, a White Democrat, represented his 60% Latinx-majority district from its creation in 1993 until his retirement in 2019. Three of the nation's four Latinx senators represent states where Latinxs make up less than a quarter of the voting eligible population. After the great wave of race-based gerrymandering stemming from *Thornburg v. Gingles* (1986), majority-minority districts were seen as the primary method producing Black and Latinx officeholding (Lublin 1997; Grofman, Handley and Lublin 2001). But the above cases, along with a handful of others, have fueled doubts about the need for majority-minority districts to achieve minority representation (Swain 1993; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997).

While important, this debate often omits the single most significant predictor of vote choice: partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Fiorina 1981; Green, Palmquist and Shickler 2002). Each of these "exceptions" appear rather normal if we instead compare their party affiliation to that of the jurisdiction they represent, as in every instance, the candidate from the party receiving the most votes in recent presidential elections won office. So is party all that matters for determining candidate prospects? While past literature tends to focus on general elections, congressional candidacy involves a multi-stage electoral process (Grofman, Handley and Lublin 2001). Candidates must first decide to run in a

[1]Upon losing to Ford in the 1996 Democratic primary, Cohen stated "It is impossible for a person who is not African American to get a large vote in the African American community..." (Bacon 2010)

1

primary election, a contest where the electorate is generally composed of like-minded partisans. It is only after clearing this intra-party hurdle (and, in some states, a runoff) that a candidate has the *opportunity* to win a seat in Congress. While party may help us understand who wins in November, other traits must be salient if voters are to decide between candidates in primary elections. A thorough examination of who wins office, and who runs, but loses, must take into account the multiple electoral steps that exist between candidacy and Capitol Hill (Juenke 2014; Juenke and Shah 2015).

In the following paper I examine non-Hispanic White, African-American, Latinx, and Asian candidate prospects at each stage of the electoral process. To do so, I leverage a database covering twelve years of congressional candidates and election outcomes, along with requisite measures of demographic and partisan context. Unifying the literature on race and representation with work on congressional primaries, I develop a theory that identifies differential effects for *both* race and party depending on the stage of the process one examines. I demonstrate that candidates are more likely to run in both the Democratic and Republican primary when their ethnic group's share of the jurisdiction is larger, and incumbents of any race are more likely to face non co-ethnic primary challenges in districts where their ethnic group's share of the electorate is smaller. Candidates in line with the district's racial/ethnic composition are much more likely to win primaries and advance to the general election stage. Once a candidate receives the party nod, however, race fades as a factor relevant to election prospects, and district partisanship becomes the main predictor determining who will win office. A regression discontinuity approach aids in making causal claims in this area, as I find that minority candidates who narrowly win their primaries far as well or better than White candidates. Thus, the "exceptions" mentioned above prove the rules that govern how race and party matter in American elections, indicating a new set of understandings that may aid in identifying locations where minority representation can be achieved.

Race, Party, and Congressional Elections

A glance at the history of minority representation in Congress indicates that the racial composition of a district strongly predicts the race of that jurisdiction's representative (Lublin 1994; Canon 1999; Grose 2011).[2] For instance, Lublin (1997) finds that Black descriptive representation is more likely than not in Black majority or plurality congressional districts. For Latinxs, the size of the Latinx population and citizenship rates predict Latinx officeholding, indicating that the pool of eligible voters drives representation. Therefore, recent debates about the role of district demographics in influencing minority officeholding instead focus on the size of the minority population necessary in order to see non-Whites elected to office (Lublin 1997; Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1999; Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004; Kousser 2008; Lublin et al. 2009). Studies that look at minority *candidacy* show a similar impact of jurisdiction demographics, with heavily-minority districts having more minority office seekers (Canon, Schousen and Sellers 1996; Canon 1999; Barreto 2007; Branton 2009; Juenke 2014; Fraga 2016).

Why is minority representation more likely to occur in heavily-minority jurisdictions? Experimental evidence also points to voter preferences a key contributing factor, where voters prefer candidates who share their descriptive characteristics (Sigelman and Sigelman 1982). Focusing on White voter evaluations of Black candidates, Terkildsen (1993) finds evidence that White voters have more negative evaluations of Black candidates than White candidates who have identical political experience, personal characteristics, and policy stances. While later experiments indicated that bias manifests primarily due to ideological cues signaled by race/ethnicity (Sigelman et al. 1995; Kam 2007), the fact that race operates a heuristic for other candidate characteristics still suggests barriers to mi-

---

[2]Even when accounting for the state-level proportion minority, the demographic composition of districts within that state appears to impact the number of minorities elected within a state (Grigg and Katz 2005).

nority success with at least some White voters (McDermott 1998; Jacobsmeier 2014; Visalvanich 2017). Evaluations of White and Latinx reactions to hypothetical Latinx-White candidate matchups also indicates co-ethnic preference may boost Latinxs with Latinx voters and reduce support among Whites (Manzano and Sanchez 2010; McConnaughy et al. 2010).

It appears evident that voters will be more likely to support candidates who are of the same race/ethnicity as themselves. Indeed, the amended Voting Rights Act itself is built on the notion that voters prefer co-ethnic representation (Guinier 1991, 1993; Ansolabehere and Fraga 2016). Yet observational evidence of the choices that voters make presents less clear results. Early case studies of Black candidates facing non-Black electorates indicated little effect of candidate race on vote choice (Becker and Heaton 1967; Hahn, Klingman and Pachon 1976; Pettigrew 1976; Pettigrew and Alston 1988), and while evidence for racially polarized voting persists in the South (Sears, Citrin and Kosterman 1987; Ansolabehere and Hersh 2014), urban Whites may be more likely to support Black candidates (Hajnal 2001, 2007). In outlining their "two forms" of racial voting, Citrin, Green and Sears (1990) indicate that racial attitudes may be incorporated into partisanship such that in real-world elections there is no clear penalty for Black candidates, a finding seemingly confirmed in more recent elections (Voss and Lublin 2001; Highton 2004). Latinx mayoral candidates get a boost in support from Latinxs even when running on the Republican ticket (Barreto 2007), suggesting a more complex relationship between vote choice and co-ethnicity for this group.

Despite the strong correlation between jurisdiction racial/ethnic composition and the race of representatives, we also see evidence of minority representation in non-minority areas. Carol Swain noted that 40% of districts represented by African-Americans in 1991 did not have a Black voting-age majority (Swain 1993: 194), and both Grose (2011) and Fraga (2016, 2018) use the growing number of "mismatches" between the numerically dominant racial/ethnic group in a district and the representatives elected from those dis-

tricts to study how representation impacts citizen behavior. Therefore, our understanding of race and congressional elections is rife with contradictions and heavily nuanced understandings that may hinder our ability to apply research findings to politics on-the-ground.

Race or Party?

One reason for these contradictions is the difficulty in incorporating party into our understandings of race and representation. Of course, party attachments are key in determining candidate preference at the individual level (Campbell et al. 1960; Fiorina 1981; Green, Palmquist and Shickler 2002). While historically incumbency played a more important role in congressional elections as compared to presidential contests, variation in partisanship is increasingly predictive of individual vote choice and district-level outcomes (Bartels 2000; Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning 2006; Jacobson and Carson 2016). The nationalization of American elections also means that voters perceive party labels as consistent indicators of a candidate's political preferences, despite state or regional variation in party stances on issues (Hopkins 2018). While two-party competition is surprisingly robust (Fraga and Hersh 2018), and voters do seem to act on ideological differences between candidates of the same party (Hall 2015), likely all scholars of electoral behavior agree that party plays an important role in shaping electoral outcomes.

Recent advances in our understanding of phenomena like nationalization point to an increasingly polarized electorate on the basis of political party. Affective polarization, where antipathy toward out-party members manifests in strong dislike for individuals identifying with the other party, demonstrates the power of party as a social identity (Iyengar et al. 2019). Mason (2018) shows that the alignment of multiple social identities with one's political party, including race/ethnicity, reinforces out-group animosity and may contribute to the rise of "partyism" in contemporary American politics. The increase in partisan voting for Congress, therefore, may be a product of polarized social identities

that are intertwined with race, ethnicity, and other inflexible traits that, as noted above, can also influence electoral behavior.

Thus, party and race are challenging to separate when only looking at the end result of a political process. Whether individual-level or institutional, party and race are increasingly aligned in electoral politics, challenging scholars who seek to understand the contribution of each of these factors to our politics (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2014; Hasen 2014; Tesler 2016; Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018). Turning back to congressional representation, strong co-ethnic affinity in congressional approval ratings may mask a more pronounced co-partisan affinity, where all but the most racially resentful White Democrats give high ratings to same-party incumbents regardless of their race (Ansolabehere and Fraga 2016). Is it accurate to say that racially resentful Republicans did not use party in their candidate evaluations? How can we tease out racial effects by looking at end-stage partisan outcomes?

Congressional Elections as a Multi-Stage Process

Evaluating the previous literature on race, party, and representation, I argue that a key disconnect between our research strategies and real-world elections is the limited acknowledgment of a multi-stage electoral process. There are multiple steps between office seeking and office holding, each of which likely introduces a different dynamic regarding the roles of race and party: the decision to run in primary elections, the primary election itself, and the general election. Experimental and survey-based work on race and elections that attempts to hold party constant may come closest to approximating primary elections, where candidates who have decided to seek office must compete against co-partisans. Highton (2004), for instance, admits that the lack of evidence of voter co-ethnic bias in general elections likely does not extend to primary matchups. The contradictions between experimental and observational findings regarding race and representation may be reconciled when accounting for this earlier, intra-party stage of the process.

Yet congressional primaries complicate the simple partisan story that appears when looking only at outcomes. Stone and Maisel (2003) note that the partisan makeup of the district has a differential impact in primaries versus the general election. Though favorable partisan conditions are likely to result in general election victory for a given candidate, these same conditions can deter primary candidacy by strong challengers as the nomination field becomes more competitive and/or incumbent candidate strength improves (Stone and Maisel 2003; Lazarus 2005; Basinger and Ensley 2007). On the other hand, candidates with little prior officeholding experience may be induced to run when they think the primary field will also be weaker (Banks and Kiewiet 1989). These offsetting effects, while not the subject of this paper, do illuminate the nuanced impact of district partisan context at the primary stage. In short, party plays a clear, significant role in the likelihood of candidate victory in the general election, but a more ambiguous role in the primary where candidates must weigh the benefits of favorable partisanship in the general against the fact that conditions favor *all* co-partisans, some of whom will be their competitors in this initial stage.

A handful of studies examining race and representation have taken first steps toward acknowledging the multi-stage process of U.S. legislative elections. For example, Branton (2009) takes stock of minority candidacy in primary elections, and finds that more African-Americans and Latinxs emerge in districts with high Black and Latinx populations, respectively. The explanation she presents draws on strategic-politician approaches, asserting that minority candidates are more likely to run in places where they think they will win; majority-minority districts (460). Other research examines general election success conditional on candidate supply, demonstrating that district racial/ethnic composition plays less of a role in producing minority representation conditional on the presence of a minority general election candidate in the first place (Shah 2014; Juenke 2014; Juenke and Shah 2015, 2016). Finally, Grofman, Handley and Lublin (2001) examines primary and general voteshares for candidates in 17 majority-Black con-

gressional districts in the South, where they advocate for future work considering the two-stage nature of elections. However, none of these studies provide a discrete analysis of each stage of the process, connecting the decision to run in partisan primary elections, candidate success in said primaries, and the general election outcomes that may be dependent on the other two stages.

The common thread between the literature on race and congressional elections, and work on party and congressional elections, is that district composition have a substantial impact on (a) who seeks office, and (b) who wins office. As a nationwide analysis of candidate prospects at each stage of the electoral process has not been conducted, I draw on the above literature to formulate hypotheses about when race and party matter. Building on Grofman, Handley and Lublin (2001) and Stone and Maisel (2003), I propose differential effects for race *and* party on candidate prospects in each stage of congressional elections. These are summarized in the following table:

	$Pr(Run_{pgi})$	$Pr(Nom_{pgi} \mid Run_{pgi})$	$Pr(Seat_{pgi} \mid Nom_{pgi})$
Co-Racial Pop. Size	+	+	No Effect
Co-Partisan Pop. Size	?	No Effect	+

Above we see three steps in the electoral process. In the first stage, primary candidate emergence (*Run*) for a candidate from party *p* and ethnic group *g* should become more likely as the concentration of said ethnic group within jurisdiction *i* increases. This follows directly from the literature on minority candidacy, particularly Branton's (2009) work on primary candidate emergence. Here, however, I do not differentiate between effects for non-Hispanic Whites and minorities, hypothesizing that ethnicity will play a similar role across groups. Given the complex relationship between primary candidacy and district partisanship, it is unclear whether an increase in the concentration of a potential candidate's party will make them more likely to enter the race. Similarly, the probability of having a party nominee (*Nom*) from party *p* and group *g*, conditional on primary candidacy by a member of the party and ethnic group, should become more

8

likely as the demographics of the district favor the candidate. Here there is no proposed relationship in the literature on party and primary candidacy, so I posit no effect of partisan alignment.[3]

In the final stage of the process, the general election, party subsumes race as determinant of outcomes. Here we see that the likelihood of winning the seat up for election (*Seat*) for party *p* and group *g*, conditional on having a nominee from the the same party and group increases as the partisan alignment of the district favors the candidate's party. While intuitive, it is important to remember that this conclusion is somewhat different from many theories of race and electoral politics, which place an emphasis on racial bloc voting (Lublin 1997; Barreto 2007). In addition, candidate-centered understandings of congressional elections would suggest that personal characteristics of incumbents and challengers may drive the general election outcomes we witness (Gelman and King 1990; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2004), disadvantaging minority candidates who make it to this stage if they are not in heavily-minority districts in the first place.

Data on Congressional Candidates

To test these expectations, one must first have detailed data about who runs for office. The dataset I use is a compilation of all Democratic and Republican congressional candidates for the six biennial elections from 2006 to 2018. Candidate names, jurisdictions, and electoral outcomes were compiled from lists provided by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC).[4] I make use of a total of 12,359 FEC candidate records, corresponding to

---

[3]Some southern states also hold intra-party runoff elections in the event no candidate wins 50% of the vote in a primary. As runoffs are essentially a second-stage primary election, I have the same theoretical expectations regarding the role of race (+) and party (no effect) respectively.

[4]http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml

over 8,900 unique individuals as a significant number of candidates ran more than once over the time period. As the FEC does not provide data on the racial/ethnic background of candidates, I coded the race/ethnicity of each individual as either non-Hispanic White, Black, Latinx, Asian, or Native American. Data on the background of each candidate was collected using statements made by candidates, membership in ethnic caucuses or organizations, ethnic advocacy foundations, news articles, and both archived and live candidate websites.[5] Appendix Tables A1 and A2 show the distribution of candidates across the five groups, separated by party affiliation, primary versus general election candidacy, and election year. Notably, the share of minority candidates has been growing across groups and in both parties year-over-year, with approximately 31% of Democratic primary candidates and 11% of Republican primary candidates identified as non-White for the 2018 election.

Table 1: Election Outcomes, by Party and Race, 2006-2018

	Total # of	Primary		Runoff		General	
	Elections	Lost	Won	Lost	Won	Lost	Won
Democrats	6280						
White	5029	217	2383	9	37	1289	1093
Black	1027	203	397	10	13	108	294
Latinx	549	93	221	3	6	65	161
Asian	278	76	99	1	2	33	67
Native Am.	33	15	9	0	0	7	2
Republicans	6119						
White	5621	99	2728	7	58	1163	1565
Black	364	133	111	2	7	101	10
Latinx	341	99	114	6	5	76	41
Asian	145	62	42	1	0	37	3
Native Am.	43	5	19	0	1	7	11

Note: Columns do not sum to the totals listed as it is possible to have different candidates from the same ethnic group win *and* lose in a single election.

---

[5]Despite these efforts, ethnicity was not ascertained for a small percentage of candidates. These individuals are listed as *missing* in Tables A1 and A2. More details about the methodology used to code candidate race/ethnicity may be found in the Appendix.

The fundamental unit of analysis in this paper is an *election*, here interpreted as a single contest between a set of candidates for House and Senate in either primary elections, primary runoffs, or general elections. Every two years, therefore, we see approximately 468 congressional *general* elections, and if every state held a partisan primary as most do, 936 congressional *primary* elections plus a small set of runoffs. Table 1 enumerates election outcomes for each party. Rows indicating a specific ethnic group correspond to elections where at least one individual from that group took part.[6] For instance, in the third row of Table 1, we see that in 108 general elections a Black Democratic candidate lost, while in 294 general elections a Black Democratic candidate won. In contrast, the third row of the Republican part of the table indicates 101 general elections where a Black Republican lost, and only ten where a Black Republican won. With data spanning a 12-year period, there are a sizable number of elections from both parties where at least one non-White candidate sought office.

Tracking minority candidate emergence and outcomes at each stage of the electoral process over time, we can already see patterns that indicate little obvious electoral penalty for minority candidates for Congress. In Figure 1, three lines indicate the percent of Democratic and Republican party candidates who are non-White who run in primary elections, win primaries and then run in general elections, and win general elections.[7] Examining trends from 2006 to 2018, we can see that the proportion of general election winners (and therefore members of Congress) who are non-White has increased from roughly 15% in 2006 to over 22% by 2018. The number of primary candidates and pri-

---

[6]Table 1 excludes "potential" elections where no candidates sought their party's nomination. However, in some states elections are not held for an office when only one candidate is running, i.e., voters do not see the election on the ballot. Here these uncontested races are included, primarily for consistency across states.

[7]Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide a detailed breakdown of the data displayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Non-White Congressional Candidate Outcomes, 2006-2018

mary winners has increased at a slightly higher rate, reaching virtual parity with the rate of officeholding by 2016, but even in 2006 the rate of success of minority candidates conditional on running in primaries or after winning a party's nomination is strikingly similar.

To better understand the district conditions shaping the rates of candidacy and success indicated in Table 1 and Figure 1, I draw on two datasets that address jurisdiction racial/ethnic composition and partisanship. To measure the racial demographics of districts and states, I use Census-derived estimates of the citizen voting-age population (CVAP). Measures of the citizenry approximate the composition of the electorate, while accounting for differential eligibility both across groups and within groups, across jurisdictions (Fraga 2018). CVAP estimates are based first on yearly estimates of the voting-age population by race/ethnicity from the Census Population Estimates Program (PEP). I then remove voting age non-citizens by subtracting the percentage of voting-age adults who are citizens as found in the Census American Community Survey (ACS). As significant changes to the demographic composition of a congressional district or state have occurred over the time frame I examine in this paper, I calculate interpolated November

12

estimates of the CVAP for each election year from 2006 through 2018.[8]

In order to determine the underlying partisanship of a jurisdiction, I rely on a measure of the normalized presidential vote based on the most recent presidential election for each year (Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning 2006). The normalized presidential vote is calculated by constructing the two-party vote totals for the most recent (including the same year) presidential election in each congressional district or state, and then subtracting the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in the district or state from the two-party vote received by the Democratic Party's presidential candidate nationally.[9] As discussed in Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning (2006: 78), such a measure allows researchers to understand the underlying partisanship of a district while avoiding the endogeneity issues associated with using the congressional election returns for the district.[10] That said, the correlation between normalized presidential vote and house election results is very high, and the effects I find below would not change when using election returns as my measure of partisanship instead.

[8]See Appendix A2 for more details regarding measurement of district and state racial/ethnic composition.

[9]For example, 2006 normalized presidential vote is based on results from the 2004 presidential election, and 2008 normalized presidential vote is based on the 2008 presidential election.

[10]In addition, if there is any relationship between candidate race and vote share independent of party, results-based measures would induce post-treatment bias.

Results

Below I separate my results for each stage of the electoral process, then further separate results by party and ethnic group.[11] While the effects of jurisdiction ethnicity and partisanship may be similar across ethnic groups and parties, the comprehensiveness of the data allows us to split up the analysis by group and observe any differences. The main focus of this paper is to understand the ethnic and/or partisan conditions that influence who seeks and wins office, and as such my dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not a candidate of a given race-party combination *appeared in* or *won* an election, depending on the stage of the process.

Minority Candidate Emergence is Driven by Race, not Party

How do race and party impact the emergence of candidates in primary elections? In this section of the analysis, I examine rates of emergence for White, Black, Latinx, and Asian American candidates conditional on the racial/ethnic and partisan composition of the jurisdictions in which they seek office. To ensure that my results are not influenced by the shifting candidate calculus generated by the top two primary system, I exclude states with this system of election from this portion of the analysis.[12]

The literature on party and candidate emergence does not produce clear predictions about how jurisdiction partisanship should influence the number of candidates who seek

---

[11]Due to the small number of Native American candidates, I do not analyze this group independently.

[12]California has the largest population of minority primary candidates, so the exclusion of results from this state for the period from 2012-2086 has the potential to impact the results. However, because the relationship between district racial/ethnic composition and candidate emergence is strong in California, the exclusion of these elections means that I produce conservative estimates of the impact of race for primary emergence.

office. As Banks and Kiewiet (1989) note, few congressional races are left uncontested by a major party. From 2006-2018, 326 primary elections did not have a candidate from one of the major parties enter the race. Democrats and Republicans are somewhat more likely to field at least one candidate in districts favorable to their party, as the association between normalized Democratic vote and Democrats contesting the race is positive ($r = 0.226$) while it is negative ($r = -0.327$) for Republicans. Can partisanship help us understand where *multiple* candidates are likely to appear? A bivariate linear model with the number of Democrats (Republicans) as the dependent variable and jurisdiction partisanship as the predictor also indicates relationships in the expected direction, positive for Democrats and negative for Republicans, but with nearly all of the variation left unexplained ($R^2 = 0.010$ for Democrats, and 0.040 for Republicans).[13] Having established that partisanship helps us understand a small part of where Democrats and Republicans run for office, the remainder of my analysis on primary candidate emergence focuses on the likelihood of having a Democratic [Republican] candidate of a particular ethnic background *conditional on at least one Democrat [Republican] seeking office.*

Here I use the simplest of nonparametric tests, a difference in means for each condition, to establish the average impact of race and party on primary candidate emergence. I also present a series of scatterplots arrayed by party and ethnic group, with the y-axis representing the CVAP of the ethnic group whose candidacy I examine, scaled as a proportion of the total CVAP, and the x-axis as the partisanship of the jurisdiction, rescaled from 0-1 with 1 representing a jurisdiction where all voters would vote for the Democratic party in an election where the national total was split evenly between the two parties.[14]

---

[13]As implied by the correlations reported above, however, potential Republican candidates do seem more "responsive" to favorable partisanship, and are more likely to enter the primary as partisanship tilts in their favor. The larger number of extremely favorable districts for Democrats likely influences this result.

[14]Thus, normalized presidential vote can be thought of as an estimate of how much

Figures 2 through 5 visualize the data regarding primary candidacy. Points on the scatterplot represent elections, with blue X marks indicating elections where at least one candidate from an ethnic group ran in the party's primary. Gray circles are elections where no candidate from the group sought office. The tables below the plots indicate the average CVAP and partisanship combination for elections featuring and not featuring a candidate from each group, and the difference in means we observe.[15] Focusing first on White Democrats and Republicans In Figure 2, we see that the great majority of elections feature at least one White primary candidate, as would be expected given the racial composition of most congressional districts and states. In jurisdictions with a smaller White population, particularly majority non-White districts, Democratic *and* Republican primaries appear less likely to have a White candidate. The average district with a White primary candidate has a White CVAP over 30 percentage points higher than districts with no White candidates, for both Democrats and Republicans. Does district partisanship play a role in determining where White candidates run? While the data would appear to indicate this is true if we isolate Republicans, examining Democrats as well indicates that this has more to do with heavily-minority districts also tilting towards the Democratic party, as White Democrats are *more* likely to emerge in partisan conditions that *do not* favor their party.

Examining Black Democratic and Republican primary candidacy in Figure 3 further demonstrates the effect of race on primary candidacy. As the Black population increases within a jurisdiction, we are more likely to see primary elections with a Black candidate. On average, districts with Black primary candidates have a Black citizen voting-age population 19-26 points higher than districts without Black candidates. Note also that the

more or less Democratic a district is in presidential voting than the nation as a whole.

[15]For consistency with past work, I also produce a set of modeled results that further examine the relationships visualized in the plots. I reference these when appropriate below, with the full results available in the Appendix.

Figure 2: Primary Candidate Emergence, **White Candidates**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta\,\mu_x$
x = % White	0.429	0.763	**+0.334**
x = % Dem	0.643	0.476	-0.167

Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta\,\mu_x$
x = % White	0.431	0.748	**+0.316**
x = % Dem	0.663	0.469	-0.194

Note: Blue X marks (×) indicate elections where at least one White candidate emerged (Y=1), while gray circles (○) indicate elections with no White candidates (Y=0). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship for elections with and without White candidates, along with the difference in means ($\Delta\mu_x$).

mean Black CVAP in districts with at least one Black Democratic candidate is 33% (28% for Republicans), well below the 50% threshold often thought to exist for Black electoral success (Lublin 1997). Given the partisanship of the African-American population, it should come as no surprise that districts that are more African-American are also more Democratic. But, as with Whites, we do not see significantly more Black Democratic candidates in Democratic districts, after accounting for the racial composition of the district. The modeled likelihood of Black primary candidacy presented in Table A3 confirms that Black CVAP is an excellent predictor of emergence, while partisanship of the district *in isolation* is not predictive of Black Democratic primary candidacy. Given the paucity of Black Republican officeholding in Congress, the connection between Black CVAP and Black Republican candidacy is somewhat surprising, but there are notable cross-party differences in the frequency of Black candidacy. Every election held in a majority-Black district had at least one Black Democrat run in the primary (most of whom are incum-

Figure 3: Primary Candidate Emergence, **Black Candidates**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}0$	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % Black	0.082	0.325	**+0.243**
x = % Dem	0.477	0.605	+0.129

Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}0$	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % Black	0.106	0.278	**+0.173**
x = % Dem	0.470	0.607	+0.137

Note: Blue X marks ($\times$) indicate elections where at least one Black candidate emerged ($Y{=}1$), while gray circles ($\bigcirc$) indicate elections with no Black candidates ($Y{=}0$). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship for elections with and without Black candidates, along with the difference in means ($\Delta\mu_x$).

bents), while less than half had a Black Republican.

Latinxs are somewhat less Democratic-leaning than the African-American population, and as such we see less of a partisanship-driven interaction between Latinx CVAP and jurisdiction partisanship in Figure 4. Instead, the panels clearly demonstrate that Latinx Democrats are more likely to seek office as the jurisdiction's ethnic composition becomes more Latinx. Districts with Latinx Democratic primary candidates have, on average, a 34 point larger Latinx citizen voting-age population, demonstrating that, as with African-Americans, Latinx candidates often emerge in non majority-minority districts. Elections featuring Latinx Republicans, while also somewhat more common in heavily-Latinx districts, are not as frequent in jurisdictions that are heavily-Latinx and heavily-Democratic. Regression results in Table A3 also show that race, not party plays the key role for both Latinx Democrats and Latinx Republicans. Indeed, Latinx Democrats are slightly more likely to run in more *Republican* districts, though the magnitude of the effect does not

Figure 4: Primary Candidate Emergence, **Latinx Candidates**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
$x = \%\ Latinx$	0.076	0.396	**+0.320**
$x = \%\ Dem$	0.494	0.583	+0.088

Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
$x = \%\ Latinx$	0.083	0.309	**+0.226**
$x = \%\ Dem$	0.477	0.541	+0.064

Note: Blue X marks (×) indicate elections where at least one Latinx candidate emerged ($Y=1$), while gray circles (○) indicate elections with no Latinx candidates ($Y=0$). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship for elections with and without Latinx candidates, along with the difference in means ($\Delta \mu_x$).

approach the impact of Latinx CVAP.

Elections featuring Asian-American candidates, while substantially less frequent than those with other minority office seekers, do appear slightly more frequent as the Asian CVAP increases on the basis of 5. While the paucity of heavily-Asian districts makes firm conclusions difficult, the visual evidence in the figure and the mean rate of emergence offers suggestive evidence that Asian American candidates are more likely to seek office as the Asian population in the district increases.

Are the primary candidates who emerge above simply one-off political novices, with no reasonable chance of victory? As Stone and Maisel (2003) note, quality candidates (defined as those with prior officeholding experience) are more judicious in their decision to run for office than non-quality candidates.[16] Furthermore, Branton (2009) demon-

---

[16]Though, as mentioned above, this does not yield clear expectations regarding district partisanship, as candidates must balance a favorable primary electorate against a

Figure 5: Primary Candidate Emergence, **Asian Candidates**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}0$	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}1$	$\Delta\,\mu_x$
x = % Asian	0.031	0.124	**+0.093**
x = % Dem	0.499	0.557	+0.057

Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}0$	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}1$	$\Delta\,\mu_x$
x = % Asian	0.031	0.099	**+0.067**
x = % Dem	0.479	0.562	+0.084

Note: Blue X marks ($\times$) indicate elections where at least one Asian candidate emerged ($Y{=}1$), while gray circles ($\bigcirc$) indicate elections with no Asian candidates ($Y{=}0$). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship for elections with and without Asian candidates, along with the difference in means ($\Delta\mu_x$).

strates that *quality* minority primary challengers are substantially more likely to emerge in heavily-minority districts, above and beyond the threshold necessary to get a minority candidate regardless of prior officeholding experience. When isolating candidates with prior officeholding experience, we indeed see that minority candidates appear more frequently in districts with greater numbers of co-ethnic voters, above and beyond the averages we see for candidates regardless of quality. Of course, most of these quality candidates are incumbents, so a fuller discussion of the roles of race and party in structuring who *challenges* incumbent representatives is in order.

For additional evidence of race as a driving force behind primary emergence, we may examine what results when incumbents are "out of step" with the ethnic composition of their district, *i.e.* holding office in a jurisdiction with a sizable non co-ethnic population. Are these candidates more likely to face primary opposition? To answer this questions I

favorable general election circumstance.

Figure 6: Non Co-Ethnic Challenger Emergence, **Primary Elections**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
$x = CVAP$	0.686	0.496	**-0.190**
$x = Party$	0.629	0.687	0.058

Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
$x = CVAP$	0.788	0.609	**-0.179**
$x = Party$	0.376	0.396	0.019

Note: Blue X marks (✕) indicate primaries where the incumbent was challenged by a *non co-ethnic* ($Y=1$), while gray circles (◯) indicate primaries where the incumbent did not face a non co-ethnic challenger ($Y=0$). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship values for each condition, and the difference in means ($\Delta \mu_x$).

modify the modeling approach slightly. For each Democratic and Republican incumbent, I record primary elections where they faced at least one challenger. I then separate the data according to the race of the challenger(s) they faced in the election. In Figure 6, blue X marks indicate elections where the incumbent faced at least one primary opponent from a *different* ethnic background than their own, and gray circles are used if they faced one or more co-ethnic challengers only. While the *x*-axis is scaled the same way as it was before (normalized partisanship), here the *y*-axis represents the CVAP of the incumbent's ethnic group.

Here we see that for Democrats, primary opposition from a co-partisan of a different ethnic background becomes substantially more likely as the incumbent's CVAP decreases. For Republicans we see that there are only six instances in which a Republican faced a primary challenge in a district where their ethnic group was less than 50% of

the electorate, and in all but two of those elections the Republican faced a non-co ethnic challenger. While it is obvious that there are many more opportunities for Democratic primary candidates to challenge incumbents when they see a "mismatch," across parties we see consistent evidence that the racial composition of the jurisdiction is highly influential in the decision to seek congressional office.

Race Predicts Who Wins the Party's Nomination

While past research has examined the emergence of White, Black, and Latinx candidates in primary elections (Branton 2009), and aided our understandings of general election success by examining party nominees Juenke (2014); Shah (2014), a complete understanding of the path from candidacy to Congress requires looking at how primary candidates perform in primary elections. The theoretical expectations I outlined suggest that primary elections are the stage of the electoral process most similar to the experimental settings used to study race and candidate support: contests are intra-party and voters must select other traits when making their vote decisions (Stone and Maisel 2003; Hall 2015). While elites certainly influence the nomination prospects of candidates (Hassell 2017), including minority candidates (Fraga and Hassell 2020), the outcomes of primary elections should indicate how race/ethnicity shapes the electoral process.

Building on previous work, I model candidate success conditional on candidate supply: what is the relationship between district demographics and primary election prospects conditional on the presence of at least one candidate of a given race? Isolating these primary elections ensures that I am able to identify the distinct impact of race/ethnicity in the primary election instead of the role of race in determining who emerges, as in the previous section. Of course, this separation is imperfect. One reason why primary emergence is so closely linked to the racial/ethnic composition of districts is an acknowledgement of the primary electorate as a barrier to success. As noted in strategic candidate theories of congressional elections (Stone and Maisel 2003), candidates, and especially candidates

with prior officeholding experience, evaluate their prospects at both the primary and general election stage. Minority candidates may be reluctant to run if they feel that their chances of winning office are low due to the lack of co-ethnics in the district.

This project focuses on separating race and party as predictors of candidate prospects at each stage of the electoral process. To model the impact of these district-level characteristics on primary election outcomes, I use a linear probability model to estimate the change in the likelihood of primary candidate success conditional on seeking the nomination.[17] Since the data covers six elections, there is likely significant association between elections held within the same district, and thus I employ cluster-robust standard errors as calculated by the estimatr function in R (Blair et al. 2018).[18] All models also include year fixed effects to account for cross-year differences.

Table 2 presents results from 16 separate regressions, first separating primary elections by party, then candidate success by race/ethnicity. As a second step, I subset the data to all primary elections with at least one primary candidate from the indicated party + race/ethnicity combination, or the much smaller set of contested primaries where no same-party incumbent was on the primary ballot. This subset may help to remove the effect of incumbency; since the vast majority of primaries are won by incumbents, incumbency may limit the extent to which current district race/ethnicity and partisan configurations can influence outcomes.

Examining results for White Democrats and Republicans first, we again see that in the intra-party stage the percent White in a jurisdiction structures White candidate success. Whether examining all elections where at least one White candidate ran for office,

---

[17]Results using a logit link function and Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) may be found in the appendix.

[18]Districts in states that underwent redistricting for the 2012 election are considered "new" districts, as the composition of the electorate and the candidates who sought office changed substantially for 2012.

Table 2: Primary Election Victory, Conditional on Candidate Emergence

	Democrats				Republicans			
	Whites	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*
ALL PRIMARIES								
CVAP	0.553*	0.907*	1.031*	1.265*	0.166*	−0.136	0.440*	0.505
	(0.064)	(0.193)	(0.127)	(0.385)	(0.039)	(0.228)	(0.182)	(0.672)
Partisanship	−0.114	0.248	−0.398	−1.020*	0.021	1.292*	0.299	1.405*
	(0.066)	(0.188)	(0.228)	(0.407)	(0.041)	(0.258)	(0.324)	(0.307)
N	2,404	557	238	126	2,609	226	170	85
Jurisdictions	879	289	127	83	927	158	114	70
R^2	0.151	0.238	0.272	0.183	0.032	0.180	0.100	0.304
CONTESTED PRIMARIES WITH NO SAME-PARTY INCUMBENT ONLY								
CVAP	0.821*	0.814*	1.209*	0.938*	0.268*	−0.390	0.268	0.214
	(0.108)	(0.304)	(0.194)	(0.339)	(0.070)	(0.271)	(0.218)	(0.707)
Partisanship	−0.281	0.005	−0.919*	−0.177	−0.001	0.847*	−0.239	0.057
	(0.148)	(0.312)	(0.390)	(0.567)	(0.079)	(0.299)	(0.378)	(0.427)
N	779	210	79	63	1,336	161	122	58
Jurisdictions	481	167	68	54	725	123	94	49
R^2	0.177	0.069	0.302	0.286	0.045	0.074	0.062	0.108

Note: Table presents regression coefficients derived from a linear probability model and accompanying cluster-robust standard errors, clustering observations at the jurisdiction level. Year fixed effects are included in all models. *Jurisdictions* represents number of unique districts and states in each model. * indicates statistical significance at $p < 0.05$.

or contested primaries with no incumbent, the racial/ethnic composition of the jurisdiction predicts where White candidates are most likely to win the nomination. This aligns with the descriptive statistics in Figure 2 and the accompanying table. We also see no significant effect of district partisanship for White Republican or Democratic primary success, aligning with theoretical expectations and indicating that, in the aggregate, even the nomination of a White or non-White Republican is associated with the racial composition of the district, not the partisanship of the general election electorate.

Black Democrats are also substantially more likely to win primary contests as their share of the electorate increases, and here no clear evidence emerges regarding a relationship between the normalized partisanship of jurisdictions and Black candidate success. Even after accounting for candidate supply and incumbency, racial demographics, rather

than party, determines whether Black Democrats are successful in primaries. Yet, results are strikingly different for Black Republicans. Here we see no relationship between the percent African-American in a jurisdiction and Black Republican success, and instead find that Black Republicans are more likely to win the primary in heavily Democratic districts. As noted by Fairdosi and Rogowski (2015), Black Republicans likely do not gain substantial support from Black constituents in general elections, and given the small number of African-Americans who would participate in Republican primaries even in a heavily-Black district, this finding may make sense. Furthermore, the success of African-American primary candidates in heavily-Democratic districts suggests little chance of winning office.

Table 2 suggests that the relationship between race, party, and the success of Latinx primary candidates is similar to that of Whites. Latinx primary candidates from either party are more common in heavily-Latinx districts, and Latinx Democratic and Republican primary success is no different. Whether looking at all primaries with at least one Latinx candidate, or just contested non-incumbent elections, a positive relationship appears with the percent Latinx in a jurisdiction. However, we also see that Latinx Democrats do better when running in heavily-Republican districts. One explanation for this finding may be that Latinxs dominate the Democratic primary electorate in some heavily-Republican districts in the Southwest. Asian American Democrats also tend to do better in primaries held in heavily-Asian districts, indicating that the supply of Asian American candidates is not the only barrier to success for this group. However, results for Asian American Republicans are less clear, and when taken together with results for Black Republicans, indicate that non-White Republican primary candidates may face a unique set of opportunities that also make general election success unlikely.

As discussed in greater detail in the appendix, similar patterns appear in the 129 primary election runoffs between 2006 and 2018. In most of these elections, the individual winning the most votes in the party primary also won a majority in the second round. As

25

the runoff is an intra-party contest, like a conventional primary, the matchup is always between co-partisans. In nine of these elections, however, the runoff pitted a minority primary candidate against a White candidate. In five contests, the candidate from the ethnic group composing a majority of the jurisdiction won the runoff, even when they did not win a plurality of the votes in the primary election. In the other contests, discussed in the appendix, details of the candidate and electoral circumstances surrounding the election indicate that scandals, outside influence, and a split vote among minority populations in the primary explain why we saw a shift from theoretical expectations. While runoff elections are infrequent, again we see signs that race plays an important role in determining who emerges from the primary field beyond determining who runs for office.

Party, not Race, Drives General Election Outcomes

The intra-party stages of the electoral process pointed to district ethnic composition as an important predictor of candidate emergence and success, confirming the predictions rooted in theories of race and electoral politics much of the time. In the general election, however, partisanship should be key in determining who wins office. Across ethnic groups and parties, Figures 7 through 10 confirm the preeminence of jurisdiction partisanship in determining who wins office. In this set of plots, each point represents an election where a nominee from the listed ethnic group represented their party in the general election, with blue X marks indicating districts where the candidate won office, and gray circles situations where the candidate lost.

White Democrats and Republicans show perhaps the greatest variation with regards to the role of party, as a nontrivial number of Democratic nominees win office in ostensibly Republican districts. Despite this, the 0.5 mark, which separates districts that lean Republican from those that lean Democratic, is a superior indicator of candidate success than the ethnic composition of the district. Districts where White Democrats won office are 18 points more Democratic than those where a White Democrat ran, but lost, while

Figure 7: General Election Victory, **White General Candidates**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}0$	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % White	0.816	0.737	-0.080
x = % Dem	0.390	0.568	**+0.178**

Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}0$	$\mu_x \mid Y{=}1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % White	0.675	0.806	+0.131
x = % Dem	0.588	0.386	**-0.203**

Note: Blue X marks (×) indicate elections where a White candidate won office ($Y{=}1$), while gray circles (○) indicate elections where at least one White candidate ran, but lost ($Y{=}0$). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship for each condition, along with the difference in means ($\Delta \mu_x$).

White Republicans won in districts 20 points more Republican than those where they lost. Table A4 confirms these relationships in regression models, but also indicate that the White CVAP plays no discernible role *at this stage of the electoral process*. Of course, as the vast majority of these general election match-ups will result in a non-Hispanic White winning office no matter which party is victorious, the results for Black, Latinx, and Asian candidates are perhaps more informative.

From 2006 to 2016, no Black Democratic party nominee won the general election in a district where past presidential election results favored the Republican party.[19] Black Republicans won their party's nomination in over 100 contests, yet only Allen West, Tim

---

[19]In 2018, a Democratic wave year, four Black Democrats won in districts that were R+5 or less. In these districts, Black citizens made up less than 15% of the district population. The modeled probabilities in Table A4 also clarify that Black CVAP plays less of a role in determining general election prospects than would otherwise be indicated by the

Figure 8: General Election Victory, **Black General Candidates**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % Black	0.166	0.472	+0.307
x = % Dem	0.394	0.748	**+0.355**

| Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % Black	0.365	0.112	-0.252
x = % Dem	0.707	0.431	**-0.276**

Note: Blue X marks (×) indicate elections where a Black candidate won office (*Y*=1), while gray circles (○) indicate elections where at least one Black candidate ran, but lost (*Y*=0). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship for elections with and without Black candidates, along with the difference in means ($\Delta\mu_x$).

Scott, Will Hurd, and Mia Love, running in districts more Republican than almost all other Black Republican nominees, were victorious. A similar story prevails for Latinxs, as Figure 9 shows that there are instances where partisanship overrides favorable demographic characteristics. Despite the presence of a Latinx nominee, and a heavily Latinx district population, 14 elections from seven congressional districts resulted in a Latinx Democrat failing to win the general election. A glance at the Republican side of the figure, however, shows that in most of these slightly Republican leaning districts, Latinx Republicans won office. Figure 10 also makes it clear that Asian congressional nominees, while infrequent, also win the general election on the basis of district partisanship rather than ethnicity. The exception is Joseph Cao (R, LA-2) who won his heavily-Democratic (and heavily-Black) New Orleans-based seat in the wake of a scandal implicating the difference in mean Black CVAP shown below the figure.

Figure 9: General Election Victory, **Latinx General Candidates**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % Latinx	0.310	0.529	+0.219
x = % Dem	0.415	0.663	**+0.248**

Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % Latinx	0.361	0.398	+0.036
x = % Dem	0.640	0.428	**-0.212**

Note: Blue X marks (×) indicate elections where a Latinx candidate won office (*Y*=1), while gray circles (○) indicate elections where at least one Latinx candidate ran, but lost (*Y*=0). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship for elections with and without Latinx candidates, along with the difference in means ($\Delta\mu_x$).

Black Democratic incumbent.[20]

The scatterplots above discretize candidate prospects as a binary outcome: won or lost. However, this binning process may mask substantive variation due to the race of the candidate winning the party's nomination. Does the race of the party's nominee impact the share of the vote that she receives? To answer this question, I leverage the multi-stage process of election to Congress, specifically, near-winners and near-losers of the Democratic primary. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), specifically, the rdrobust package in R (Calonico et al. 2018), I am able to determine the local causal effect of having a non-White party nominee on general election prospects, assuming "as-if" random assignment of minority versus White nominees near the threshold for primary candidate

---

[20]He subsequently lost his bid for reelection to Cedric Richmond, an African-American Democrat.

Figure 10: General Election Victory, **Asian General Candidates**

Democrats	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % Asian	0.046	0.225	+0.180
x = % Dem	0.430	0.627	**+0.197**

| Republicans	$\mu_x \mid Y=0$	$\mu_x \mid Y=1$	$\Delta \mu_x$
x = % Asian	0.151	0.015	-0.136
x = % Dem	0.669	0.515	**-0.153**

Note: Blue X marks (×) indicate elections where a Asian candidate won office (Y=1), while gray circles (○) indicate elections where at least one Asian candidate ran, but lost (Y=0). Tables list mean (μ_x) CVAP and normalized partisanship for elections with and without Asian candidates, along with the difference in means ($\Delta \mu_x$).

victory.[21] I narrow the RDD analysis to the 369 primary elections where the winner and second-place candidate differed in race and at least one of the candidates was White.

Examining Figure 11, we see no evidence that minority barely-winners in primaries receive a lower share of the vote in the subsequent general election than White barely-winners. Here the y-axis represents the Democratic share of the two-party vote in the general election featuring the primary nominee, and the x-axis indicates the margin of victory (right side of the figure) or loss (left side of the figure) for the minority candidate who either won or was in second place in the primary election. The dividing line at 0 on the x-axis indicates the separation between minority candidates who barely lost and barely won the primary. The small gray points indicate the entire set of observations, and

---

[21]This approach is similar to that used by Hall (2015) to study the general election impact of having an "extremist" primary candidate win the party's nomination.

Figure 11: General Election Vote Share after Primary Elections with non-White Candidates, Democrats Only

Note: Figure includes elections where there was a difference in the race/ethnicity of the Democratic primary winner and runner up, and at least one of the top two primary candidates was White. Small gray points present raw data of the non-White candidate's primary margin and the general election voteshare of the Democratic nominee. Large black points are the average in 0.07 percentage point bins of the non-White candidate's margin, the bin size best reflecting the underlying variance in the data with spacing estimators (Calonico et al. 2018). Blue lines are nonparametric polynomial smoothers fit to the black points on each side of the discontinuity.

the large black circles binned averages calculated from Calonico et al. (2018). The blue line is a nonparametric polynomial smoother fit to the black circles, where the difference in the intercept with the 0 line on the x-axis indicates the local causal effect.

First, note that in highly contested primaries where at least one candidate is non-White, the share of the vote candidates receive is lower, on average, than in less contested primaries. This accords with theoretical expectations regarding the role of contested primaries in diminishing general election prospects for the party (Bernstein 1977; Born 1981). However, the more relevant pattern in Figure 11 is that the local average treatment effect for minority candidates who barely won the primary is *positive*, indicating that, if anything, minority candidates may do *better* than White candidates in general

elections after contested primaries (effect size = 0.076, robust se = 0.053). While the full set of mechanisms producing this result are not explored here, this challenges our literature-derived expectations regarding the difficulties minority Democrats face with Whites (Ansolabehere and Fraga 2016) and again points to the power of party, not race, in driving general election outcomes.[22]

Conclusion

The existing literature on electoral politics produces a set of clear predictions: an increase in the size of an ethnic group benefits co-ethnics, and favorable jurisdiction partisanship favors co-partisans. But how do these factors work together to produce the electoral outcomes we witness? Integrating the literature on race and politics with work examining congressional primaries, I examined each stage of the electoral process. I posited that race would be the salient factor predicting candidate emergence and success in intra-party stages, while party would determine officeholding after the general election. The results I present above largely confirm these proposed relationships, across ethnic groups and parties. As the ethnic composition of a jurisdiction tilts in favor of politicians from a particular background, we see more primary entry and nomination from co-ethnics. Once partisans choose their nominee, however, party takes over as the key predictor of candidate success. We see no evidence that minority Democratic primary nominees face a disadvantage at the general election stage, and indeed, Black, Latinx, and Asian American general election candidates almost always win when they are in a district with favorable partisan conditions.

---

[22]Here I focus on Democrats because that is where we see the most diversity in terms of candidate outcomes. For Republicans or a combined dataset of Democrats and Republicans, I find no evidence that non-White candidates are significantly disadvantaged after winning their party's primary.

How do these findings comport with present understandings of individual voter behavior? Clearly, the discussion of general election prospects confirms an important role for party. In partisan primaries, however, the electorate is forced to consider factors outside of party when deciding for whom to vote. The results above align with other work finding race to be salient in intra-party match-ups, as individuals appear to prefer co-ethnic candidates when choosing among co-partisans (Citrin, Green and Sears 1990; Highton 2004; Grose 2005; Nelson 2007; Hopkins 2009). Apparent strategic entry by challengers highlights the possibility that candidates understand co-ethnic preference as a salient force in election outcomes. Yet we also see that a minority group need not compose a majority of the district to gain the party's nomination, a finding that may result from differences in the composition of the partisan electorate (Grofman, Handley and Lublin 2001), or choices made by primary electorates evaluating ideology and general election prospects (Hall 2015). Finally, by understanding candidacy as involving multiple electoral steps, my work may also help elucidate circumstances where the distinction, or choice, between descriptive and substantive representation must be made (Brace, Grofman and Handley 1987; Hill 1995; Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997, 1999).

Taken as a whole, however, the results above also imply a need to reframe key findings relating race, party, and electoral politics. One oft-asked question probes whether race trumps party, or vice-versa (*e.g.* Citrin, Green and Sears 1990; Barreto 2010). The findings here do not align with survey-based or experimental attempts to understand which factor matters more, however, because elections usually involve a multi-stage process where race and party both play significant, though not necessarily concurrent, roles. When evaluating policies such as the Voting Rights Act, my findings regarding the relevance of race in primary elections join recent work pointing towards a reevaluation of the conditions relevant to minority candidate success (Grofman, Handley and Lublin 2001; Lublin et al. 2009; Hasen 2014). A test for intra-group electoral cohesion in the general election

will likely overlook the important role of race in voter decisionmaking. Rather than attempting to distinguish between racial bloc voting and "partisan" bloc voting, scholars and policymakers should consider how intra-party contestation shapes the choices voters have available in the inter-party general election.

The above manuscript began with a set of "exceptions," where candidates won election under demographic conditions that seemed to preclude their success. By acknowledging race, party, and the multi-stage electoral process, we gain a better understanding of how Steve Cohen, Tim Scott, and numerous other candidates ended up in Congress. Clearly, more individual-level work must be done to clarify the relationship between race and party, two of our most salient, and increasingly intertwined, political identities (Green, Palmquist and Shickler 2002; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Tesler 2016). It is only by understanding both of these factors together, however, that we may begin to understand the connection between the characteristics of those who represent us and the electoral circumstances that produced them.

References

Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning. 2006. "Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections." *Journal of Politics* 68(1):75–88.

Ansolabehere, Stephen and Bernard L. Fraga. 2016. "Do Americans Prefer Coethnic Representation? The Impact of Race on House Incumbent Evaluations." *Stanford Law Review* 68(6):1553–1594.

Ansolabehere, Stephen and Eitan Hersh. 2014. "Voter Registration: The Process and Quality of Lists". In *The Measure of American Elections*, ed. Barry C. Burden and Charles Stewart, III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ansolabehere, Stephen and James M. Snyder. 2004. "Using Term Limits to Estimate

Incumbency Advantages when Officeholders Retire Strategically." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29(4):487–515.

Bacon, Perry Jr. 2010. "White lawmaker finds acceptance from black caucus, but not as a member." *The Washington Post.* July 20, 2010.

Banks, Jeffrey S. and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. "Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(4):997–1015.

Barreto, Matt A. 2007. "¡Sí Se Puede! Latino Candidates and the Mobilization of Latino Voters." *American Political Science Review* 101(3):425–441.

Barreto, Matt A. 2010. *Ethnic Cues: The Role of Shared Ethnicity in Latino Political Participation.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1):65–75.

Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1):35–50.

Basinger, Scott J. and Michael J. Ensley. 2007. "Candidates, Campaigns, or Partisan Conditions? Reevaluating Strategic-Politicians Theory." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22(3):361–394.

Becker, John F. and Eugene E. Heaton. 1967. "The Election of Senator Edward W. Brooke." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 31:346–358.

Bernstein, Robert A. 1977. "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956-1972." *American Political Science Review* 71(2):540–545.

Blair, Graeme, Jasper Cooper, Alexander Coppock, Macartan Humphreys, Luke Sonnet and Neal Fultz. 2018. *Package 'estimatr'.* R Package, Version 0.14 (October 29, 2018): https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/estimatr/.

Born, Richard. 1981. "The Influence of House Primary Election Divisiveness on General

Election Margins, 1962-76." *Journal of Politics* 43(3):640–661.

Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley. 1987. "Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help Republicans?" *Journal of Politics* 49(1):167–185.

Branton, Regina P. 2009. "The Importance of Race and Ethnicity in Congressional Primary Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 62(3):459–473.

Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Cattaneo, Max H. Farrell and Rocío Titiunik. 2018. *Package 'rdrobust'*. R Package, Version 0.99.4 (September 26, 2018): http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/rdrobust.

Cameron, Charles, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" *American Political Science Review* 90(4):794–812.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.

Canon, David. 1999. *Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Canon, David, Matthew M. Schousen and Patrick J. Sellers. 1996. "The Supply Side of Congressional Redistricting: Race and Strategic Politicians, 1972-1992." *Journal of Politics* 58(3):846–862.

Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green and David O. Sears. 1990. "White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54(1):74–96.

Fairdosi, Amir Shawn and Jon C. Rogowski. 2015. "Candidate Race, Partisanship, and Political Participation: When Do Black Candidates Increase Black Turnout?" *Political Research Quarterly* 68(2):337–349.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Fraga, Bernard L. 2016. "Candidates or Districts? Reevaluating the Role of Race in Voter Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1):97–122.

Fraga, Bernard L. 2018. *The Turnout Gap: Race, Ethnicity, and Political Inequality in a Diversifying America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fraga, Bernard L. and Eitan D. Hersh. 2018. "Are Americans Stuck in Uncompetitive Enclaves? An Appraisal of U.S. Electoral Competition." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 13(3):291–311.

Fraga, Bernard L. and Hans J. G. Hassell. 2020. "Are Minority Candidates Penalized by Party Politics? Race, Gender, and Access to Party Support and Donor Networks." *Political Research Quarterly* In Press.

Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1990. "Estimating Incumbency Advantage Without Bias." *American Journal of Political Science* 34(4):1142–1164.

Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist and Eric Shickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Grigg, Delia and Jonathan N. Katz. 2005. "The Impact of Majority-Minority Districts on Congressional Elections." Presented at the 2005 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.

Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley and David Lublin. 2001. "Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Evidence." *North Carolina Law Review* 79:1383–1430.

Grose, Christian R. 2005. "Disentangling Constituency and Legislator Effects in Legislative Representation: Black Legislators or Black Districts?" *Social Science Quarterly* 86(2):427–443.

Grose, Christian R. 2011. *Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Guinier, Lani. 1991. "The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success." *University of Michigan Law Review* 89(5):1077–1154.

Guinier, Lani. 1993. *The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy*. New York: Free Press.

Hahn, Harlan, David Klingman and Harry Pachon. 1976. "Cleavages, Coalitions, and the Black Candidate: The Los Angeles Mayoral Elections of 1969 and 1973." *Western Political Quarterly* 29(4):507–520.

Hajnal, Zoltan L. 2001. "White Residents, Black Incumbents, and a Declining Racial Divide." *American Political Science Review* 95(3):603–617.

Hajnal, Zoltan L. 2007. *Changing White Attitudes Toward Black Political Leadership*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hajnal, Zoltan L. and Taeku Lee. 2011. *Why Americans Don't Join the Party: Race, Immigration, and the Failure (of Political Parties) to Engage the Electorate*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hall, Andrew B. 2015. "What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?" *American Political Science Review* 109(1):18–42.

Hasen, Richard L. 2014. "Essay: Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere." *Harvard Law Review* 127(1):58–75.

Hassell, Hans J. G. 2017. *The Party's Primary: Control of Congressional Nominations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Highton, Benjamin. 2004. "White Voters and African American Candidates for Congress." *Political Behavior* 26(1):1–25.

Hill, Kevin. 1995. "Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans?" *Journal of Politics* 57(2):384–401.

Hopkins, Daniel J. 2009. "No More Wilder Effect, Never a Whitman Effect: When and Why Polls Mislead about Black and Female Candidates." *Journal of Politics* 71(3):769–781.

Hopkins, Daniel J. 2018. *The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, Shanto, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra and Sean J. West-

wood. 2019. "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science* Forthcoming.

Jacobsmeier, Matthew L. 2014. "Racial Stereotypes and Perceptions of Representatives' Ideologies in U.S. House Elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39(2):261–291.

Jacobson, Gary C and Jamie L. Carson. 2016. *The Politics of Congressional Elections.* 9th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Juenke, Eric Gonzalez. 2014. "Ignorance is Bias: The Effect of Latino Losers on Models of Latino Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3):593–603.

Juenke, Eric Gonzalez and Paru Shah. 2015. "Not the usual story: the effect of candidate supply on models of Latino descriptive representation." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 3(3):438–453.

Juenke, Eric Gonzalez and Paru Shah. 2016. "Demand and Supply: Racial and Ethnic Minority Candidates in White Districts." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 1(1):60–90.

Kam, Cindy. 2007. "Implicit Attitudes, Explicit Choices: When Subliminal Priming Predicts Candidate Preference." *Political Behavior* 29(3):343–367.

Kousser, J. Morgan. 2008. "Has California Gone Colorblind?". In *The New Political Geography of California*, ed. Frederick Douzet, Thad Kousser and Kenneth P. Miller. Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies pp. 267–290.

Lazarus, Jeffrey. 2005. "Unintended Consequences: Anticipation of General Election Outcomes and Primary Election Divisiveness." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30(3):435–461.

Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'." *American Political Science Review* 93(1):183–186.

Lublin, David Ian. 1994. "Gerrymander for justice? Racial redistricting and black and

Latino representation." Ph.D. diss. Harvard University.

Lublin, David, Thomas L. Brunell, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley. 2009. "Has the Voting Rights Act Outlived Its Usefulness? In a Word, 'No'." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34(4):525–553.

Manzano, Sylvia and Gabriel R. Sanchez. 2010. "Take One for the Team? Limits of Shared Ethnicity and Candidate Preferences." *Political Research Quarterly* 63(3):568–580.

Mason, Lilliana. 2018. *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McConnaughy, Corrine M., Ismail K. White, David L. Leal and Jason P. Casellas. 2010. "A Latino on the Ballot: Explaining Coethnic Voting Among Latinos and the Response of White Americans." *Journal of Politics* 72(4):1199–1211.

McDermott, Monika L. 1998. "Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 51(4):895–918.

Nelson, Janai S. 2007. "White Challengers, Black Majorities: Reconciling Competition in Majority-Minority Districts with the Promise of the Voting Rights Act." *Georgetown Law Journal* 95:1287–1312.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1976. "Black Mayoral Campaigns". In *Urban Governance and Minorities*, ed. Herrington Bryce. New York: Praeger pp. 14–28.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Denise A. Alston. 1988. *Tom Bradley's Campaign for Governor*. Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies.

Sears, David O., Jack Citrin and Rich Kosterman. 1987. "Jesse Jackson and the Southern White Electorate in 1984". In *Blacks in Southern Politics*, ed. Lawrence W. Moreland, Robert P. Steed and Tod A. Baker. New York: Praeger.

Shah, Paru. 2014. "It Takes A Black Candidate: A Supply-Side Theory of Minority Representation." *Political Research Quarterly* 67(2):266–279.

Sides, John, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck. 2018. *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press.

Sigelman, Carol K., Lee Sigelman, Barbara J. Walkosz and Michael Nitz. 1995. "Black Candidates, White Voters: Understanding Racial Bias in Political Perceptions." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(1):243–265.

Sigelman, Lee and Carol K. Sigelman. 1982. "Sexism, Racism, and Ageism in Voting Behavior: An Experimental Analysis." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 45:263–269.

Stone, Walter J. and L. Sandy Maisel. 2003. "The Not-So-Simple Calculus of Winning: Potential U.S. House Candidates' Nomination and General Election Prospects." *Journal of Politics* 65(4):951–977.

Swain, Carol. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Terkildsen, Nadya. 1993. "When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4):1032–1053.

Tesler, Michael. 2016. *Post-Racial or Most-Racial: Race and Politics in the Obama Era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Thernstrom, Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom. 1997. *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Visalvanich, Neil. 2017. "When does race matter? Exploring white responses to minority congressional candidates." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 5(4):618–641.

Voss, D. Stephen and David Lublin. 2001. "Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections." *American Politics Research* 29(2):141–182.

Online Appendix for "Separating Race and Party in Congressional Elections"

Bernard L. Fraga

Rev. June 9, 2020

A1 Candidate Data

A1.1 Candidate Race/Ethnicity Coding Methodology

While the Congressional Research Service provides information regarding the racial/ethnic composition of U.S. House and Senate members, there is no public repository providing multi-year, national data on the race/ethnicity of those who seek congressional office. The first step in gathering this data was to rely on the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) lists of candidates who appeared on the primary or general election ballot in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, or 2018.[1] Total, this data collection yielded 12,359 candidates who sought office as Democrats or Republicans.[2]

To determine the race/ethnicity of candidates I employed a multi-year process of guided human coding starting in 2011, with a combination of undergraduate and graduate research assistants, my own coding and verification, and a collaboration in the collection of 2014 data with Prof. Elizabeth Simas of the University of Houston. The primary source of information was candidate websites, found using internet searches or archival services such as the Wayback Machine. Candidate biographies for Latinx and Asian American candidates often indicated their ancestry, and a nontrivial number of White and African-American candidates also provide this information or indicate their membership in race or ancestry-based organizations. Where this information was not available, coders searched for news articles that indicated the race/ethnicity of candidates, listings maintained by advocacy groups (e.g, NALEO), or membership in legislative

---

[1]FEC records of election outcomes also cover candidates running unopposed, even when a formal vote for these candidates is not recorded.

[2]Third party and write-in candidates were excluded, except if they won office. These candidates were grouped with the parties they caucus with in Congress. For example, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) is considered to be a Democrat for the purposes of this project.

caucuses that suggest ancestry. If all of the above information was not available, coders relied on a combination of name and phenotype to determine the race/ethnicity of candidates. Cross-year matching, along with intercoder reliability checks, was employed to limit the number of misidentified candidates. Candidates whose race/ethnicity could not be established (generally due to a complete lack of information about the candidate outside of FEC data) were left blank and are listed as "Missing" in Tables A1 and A2.

The coding guidelines provided to the coders indicated that they should label the race/ethnicity of candidates into one of six categories. Below are the instructions for coding "Race" that were provided to coders:

- **White** (non-Hispanic White): Includes European ancestry (including Spain), Armenian

- **Black**: Includes Haitian, Jamaican, Trinidadian, and African

- **Latinx** (Hispanic): Includes any ancestry from Latin America. Does not include Spain unless accompanied by Latin American ancestry.

- **Asian**: Includes South and Southeast Asian.

- **Mideast**[3] (from "Middle East and North Africa" region): Includes Turkish, Egyptian, Iranian/Persian

- **Native** (Native American): Must indicate tribal membership. Includes Native Hawaiian and Alaska Native.

---

[3]This category was not coded consistently year-to-year, and Census definitions currently classify the Middle East North African (MENA) population as White. For this project, these candidates were coded as White. Removing these candidates from the study does not impact the results shown in the paper.

In practice, candidates that did not clearly fall into the categories received an annotation and were then evaluated and, if necessary, coded by the author. Multiracial candidates were labeled with their non-White ancestry group, or with the ancestry group that most closely matched their public perception. For example, Bobby Scott (VA-03), whose maternal grandmother is Filipino but whose parents identified as African-American, was labeled as African-American for this project.

A1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Candidate Data

Tables A1 and A2 provide the count and percentage of each party's candidates falling into the five racial/ethnic categories that were used in this project. Many candidates appeared in multiple years, such that these tables should not be taken to provide an indication of the number of unique individuals in the dataset. However, in no year do we see more than 0.75% of general election candidates with missing data on race/ethnicity, or more than 4.1% of primary candidates who could not be coded. Candidates with missing race information constitute approximately 110 unique candidates, or 1% of all unique candidates from 2006-2018. Candidates with missing race information were not included in the study, except to determine the number of candidates seeking office and whether or not an election was contested.

Table A1: Distribution of House and Senate Candidates, 2006-2018 *(Counts)*

	2006 P	2006 G	2008 P	2008 G	2010 P	2010 G	2012 P	2012 G	2014 P	2014 G	2016 P	2016 G	2018 P	2018 G
Democrats	787	444	772	455	736	447	863	446	720	433	796	443	1166	465
White	623	367	599	371	549	358	608	329	501	322	547	313	838	326
Black	85	44	92	47	122	51	134	62	123	62	129	65	172	72
Latinx	30	25	44	28	36	25	81	35	53	34	77	42	82	41
Asian	17	7	12	8	17	12	33	19	33	14	33	18	67	24
Native American	2	0	5	0	2	1	4	1	3	1	6	4	3	2
Missing	30	1	20	1	10	0	3	0	7	0	4	1	4	0
Republicans	671	411	719	425	1279	467	1008	444	875	427	921	429	1009	426
White	589	379	658	396	1150	422	904	403	786	386	804	378	859	371
Black	24	13	17	12	45	15	38	13	42	19	39	18	56	21
Latinx	16	8	13	9	45	21	38	19	28	16	49	23	58	21
Asian	10	6	15	6	19	5	16	5	12	3	15	5	22	10
Native American	3	2	1	1	2	2	4	2	4	3	6	5	4	3
Missing	29	3	15	1	18	2	8	2	3	0	8	0	10	0

Note: Does not include candidates from Louisiana in 2006 or 2012-2018. These elections and candidates are excluded from the study. *P* indicates candidates in primary elections, *G* indicates candidates in general elections.

Table A2: Distribution of House and Senate Candidates, 2006-2018 *(Percentages)*

	2006 P	2006 G	2008 P	2008 G	2010 P	2010 G	2012 P	2012 G	2014 P	2014 G	2016 P	2016 G	2018 P	2018 G
Democrats														
White	79.2	82.7	77.6	81.5	74.6	80.1	70.5	73.8	69.6	74.4	68.7	70.7	71.9	70.1
Black	10.8	9.9	11.9	10.3	16.6	11.4	15.5	13.9	17.1	14.3	16.2	14.7	14.8	15.5
Latinx	3.8	5.6	5.7	6.2	4.9	5.6	9.4	7.8	7.4	7.9	9.7	9.5	7.0	8.8
Asian	2.2	1.6	1.6	1.8	2.3	2.7	3.8	4.3	4.6	3.2	4.1	4.1	5.7	5.2
Native American	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.9	0.3	0.4
Missing	3.8	0.2	2.6	0.2	1.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.0
Republicans														
White	87.8	92.2	91.5	93.2	89.9	90.4	89.7	90.8	89.8	90.4	87.3	88.1	85.1	87.1
Black	3.6	3.2	2.4	2.8	3.5	3.2	3.8	2.9	4.8	4.4	4.2	4.2	5.6	4.9
Latinx	2.4	1.9	1.8	2.1	3.5	4.5	3.8	4.3	3.2	3.7	5.3	5.4	5.7	4.9
Asian	1.5	1.5	2.1	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.4	0.7	1.6	1.2	2.2	2.3
Native American	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	1.2	0.4	0.7
Missing	4.3	0.7	2.1	0.2	1.4	0.4	0.8	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.9	0.0	1.0	0.0

Note: Does not include candidates from Louisiana in 2006 or 2012-2018. These elections and candidates are excluded from the study. *P* indicates candidates in primary elections, *G* indicates candidates in general elections.

A2 District Racial/Ethnic Composition

Census Bureau products allow individuals to list more than one race, and indicates Hispanic/Latinx as an ethnicity, as per guidelines from the Office of Management and Budget (*see* 62 FR 58782). The citizen voting-age population data used in this paper is based on estimates of the single-race non-Hispanic White, single-race Black, Hispanic or Latino (of any race), single-race Asian, and single-race American Indian and Alaska Native populations. Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders were classified with Asians prior to the 2000 Census, and indeed, research on Asian-American Politics generally continues to see these populations as linked (*cf.* Lien et al. 2001; Ong and Nakanishi 2003; Ramakrishnan et al. 2008), so I follow this convention for 49 states. In Hawaii, where the congressional delegation, state legislature, and Native Hawaiian groups indicated they consider Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders to be part of a broader "indigenous peoples" category with American Indians and Alaska Natives (62 FR 58785), I instead combine Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders with American Indians and Alaska Natives. Individuals of more than one race, totaling 2.9% of the 2010 population, and those marking "Other" or declining to indicate a race are included in the denominator when determining relative population sizes, but are not examined independently here.

A3 Supplemental Regression Results

Table A3: Primary Emergence, Given at least one Democrat/Republican Runs

	Democrats				Republicans			
	Whites	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*
CVAP	0.936*	1.743*	1.335*	1.505*	0.370*	0.591*	0.761*	0.732*
	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.244)	(0.051)	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.147)
Partisanship	−0.088	0.028	−0.076*	−0.058*	−0.222*	0.235*	−0.017	0.026
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.027)
Open Seat	0.055*	0.134*	0.042*	0.050*	0.010	0.063*	0.044*	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.010)
2008	−0.023	−0.008	0.014	0.002	0.009	−0.015	−0.014	0.014
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)
2010	0.022	0.021	−0.013	0.006	0.036*	0.022	0.033*	0.012
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)
2012	−0.007	0.062*	0.014	0.019	0.011	0.019	0.027	0.009
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.011)
2014	−0.040	0.051*	−0.013	0.033*	0.005	0.040*	0.003	0.008
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.011)
2016	−0.009	0.055*	0.008	0.018	0.004	0.031	0.025	0.005
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.011)
2018	−0.003	0.132*	0.018	0.071*	−0.005	0.064*	0.033*	0.023
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Constant	0.226*	−0.100*	−0.024	−0.005	0.766*	−0.132*	−0.025	−0.017
	(0.067)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.062)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.014)
N	2,840	2,840	2,840	2,840	2,778	2,778	2,778	2,778
Jurisdictions	956	956	956	956	954	954	954	954
R^2	0.333	0.450	0.425	0.156	0.162	0.146	0.181	0.053

Note: Estimates derived from a linear probability model, clustering observations at the jurisdiction level. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *Jurisdictions* represents number of unique districts and states in each model. * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$.

Table A4: General Election Victory

	Democrats				Republicans	
	Whites	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*	*Whites*	*Latinxs*
CVAP	0.155*	0.638*	0.533*	−0.028	−0.109	0.260
	(0.075)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.356)	(0.061)	(0.176)
Partisanship	2.808*	1.536*	1.553*	3.018*	−2.649*	−2.580*
	(0.075)	(0.177)	(0.210)	(0.473)	(0.071)	(0.260)
Open Seat	−0.010	0.022	0.023	−0.120	0.005	0.071
	(0.023)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.088)	(0.021)	(0.121)
2008	0.074*	−0.036	−0.005	−0.210	−0.067*	0.015
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.064)	(0.113)	(0.017)	(0.113)
2010	−0.117*	−0.038	−0.098	−0.187	0.085*	0.101
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.090)	(0.117)	(0.020)	(0.128)
2012	−0.050	−0.043	−0.049	−0.144	0.040	−0.034
	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.094)	(0.126)	(0.025)	(0.153)
2014	−0.115*	−0.047	−0.082	−0.035	0.087*	0.064
	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.087)	(0.132)	(0.025)	(0.150)
2016	−0.114*	−0.029	−0.126	−0.171	0.072*	0.190
	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.090)	(0.138)	(0.025)	(0.136)
2018	0.028	0.047	−0.016	−0.142	−0.048	0.063
	(0.027)	(0.049)	(0.080)	(0.119)	(0.025)	(0.144)
Constant	−0.959*	−0.516*	−0.427*	−0.903*	1.889*	1.665*
	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.121)	(0.249)	(0.074)	(0.200)
N	2,398	412	228	100	2,750	117
Jurisdictions	867	188	101	54	980	78
R^2	0.525	0.707	0.487	0.642	0.547	0.577

Note: Estimates derived from a linear probability model, clustering observations at the jurisdiction level. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *Jurisdictions* represents number of unique districts and states in each model. * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$.

A3.1 Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) Logit Results

Because of the binary nature of the outcomes I examine in this paper (officeseeking, winning or losing primary or general elections), we can conduct an alternative modeling strategy where a generalized linear model with logit link function is used in place of a linear probability model. To ensure I still account for temporal features of the data, I employ a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) logit to model within-jurisdiction dependence. GEEs account for within-cluster dependence in both the estimation of coefficients and error terms (Liang and Zeger 1986; Zorn 2006), and thus are similar to random-effects and fixed-effects models, but do not force the result to be the average within-cluster treatment effect (Gardiner, Luo and Roman 2009). I allow the data to determine the structure of the correlation between clustered observations, and make use of heteroskedasticity-robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrix in all GEE models to ensure my standard errors are resilient to misspecification of the working correlation matrix (Zorn 2006).

Table A5: Primary Election Victory, Conditional on Candidate Emergence, GEE Logit

	Democrats				Republicans			
	Whites	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*
ALL PRIMARIES								
CVAP	0.607*	1.026*	1.091*	1.289*	0.172*	−0.084	0.476*	−0.714
	(0.065)	(0.184)	(0.119)	(0.332)	(0.041)	(0.217)	(0.170)	(6.353)
Partisanship	−0.140*	0.134	−0.536*	−1.005*	0.037	1.356*	0.396	2.221
	(0.064)	(0.186)	(0.223)	(0.331)	(0.040)	(0.240)	(0.295)	(1.586)
N	2,404	557	238	126	2,609	226	170	85
Jurisdictions	879	289	127	83	927	158	114	70
R^2	0.149	0.235	0.268	0.169	0.032	0.176	0.095	0.260
CONTESTED PRIMARIES WITH NO SAME-PARTY INCUMBENT ONLY								
CVAP	0.830*	0.852*	1.045*	1.018*	0.279*	−0.366	0.269	0.141
	(0.106)	(0.286)	(0.241)	(0.267)	(0.079)	(0.264)	(0.202)	(0.674)
Partisanship	−0.287*	0.000	−0.969*	−0.333	0.041	0.793*	−0.043	−0.227
	(0.146)	(0.297)	(0.404)	(0.426)	(0.091)	(0.347)	(0.360)	(0.715)
N	779	210	79	63	775	132	102	40
Jurisdictions	481	167	68	54	513	102	85	36
R^2	0.177	0.068	0.275	0.282	0.046	0.070	0.066	0.113

Note: Table presents regression coefficients derived from a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) with logit link function, clustering observations at the jurisdiction level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and year fixed effects are included in all models. *Jurisdictions* represents number of unique districts and states in each model. * indicates statistical significance at $p < 0.05$.

Table A6: Primary Emergence, Given at least one Democrat/Republican Runs, GEE Logit

	Democrats				Republicans			
	Whites	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*
CVAP	0.932*	1.737*	1.319*	1.493*	0.373*	0.595*	0.756*	0.735*
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.240)	(0.050)	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.140)
Partisanship	−0.093	0.042	−0.065	−0.048	−0.215*	0.227*	−0.016	0.025
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.027)
Open Seat	0.048*	0.126*	0.040*	0.040*	0.007	0.061*	0.048*	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.010)
2008	−0.016	−0.008	0.011	0.001	0.009	−0.014	−0.006	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)
2010	0.025	0.019	−0.015	0.006	0.036*	0.023	0.036*	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)
2012	−0.002	0.060*	0.011	0.017	0.014	0.022	0.030*	0.010
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.011)
2014	−0.037	0.042*	−0.021	0.035*	0.005	0.039*	0.007	0.008
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.011)
2016	−0.011	0.055*	0.007	0.015	0.004	0.031	0.032*	0.004
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.011)
2018	0.002	0.133*	0.015	0.069*	−0.005	0.064*	0.038*	0.023
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Constant	0.230*	−0.104*	−0.026	−0.008	0.761*	−0.129*	−0.029	−0.017
	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.060)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.014)
N	2,840	2,840	2,840	2,840	2,778	2,778	2,778	2,778
Jurisdictions	956	956	956	956	954	954	954	954
R^2	0.333	0.450	0.425	0.156	0.162	0.146	0.181	0.053
Marginal R^2	0.343	0.465	0.443	0.115	0.154	0.119	0.159	0.049
Cluster Corr. ($\hat{\rho}$)	0.368	0.253	0.299	0.287	0.171	0.201	0.222	0.099

Note: Estimates derived from a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) with logit link function, clustering observations at the jurisdiction level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Jurisdictions* represents number of unique districts and states in each model. *Cluster Corr.* indicates mean intra-cluster correlation. * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$.

Table A7: General Election Victory, GEE Logit

	Democrats				Republicans	
	Whites	*Blacks*	*Latinxs*	*Asians*	*Whites*	*Latinxs*
CVAP	0.135	0.620*	0.630*	0.154	−0.071	0.198
	(0.075)	(0.168)	(0.188)	(0.309)	(0.059)	(0.157)
Partisanship	2.709*	1.633*	1.512*	2.796*	−2.536*	−2.410*
	(0.071)	(0.160)	(0.215)	(0.349)	(0.068)	(0.231)
Open Seat	−0.006	0.049	0.057	−0.064	0.003	0.004
	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.020)	(0.117)
2008	0.080*	−0.022	0.009	−0.193*	−0.071*	0.055
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.080)	(0.017)	(0.061)
2010	−0.116*	−0.009	−0.106	−0.179*	0.091*	0.105
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.062)	(0.073)	(0.019)	(0.082)
2012	−0.055*	0.007	−0.040	−0.085	0.052*	−0.021
	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.084)	(0.102)	(0.024)	(0.125)
2014	−0.113*	−0.010	−0.077	−0.032	0.094*	0.099
	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.024)	(0.117)
2016	−0.110*	0.011	−0.108	−0.136	0.083*	0.215
	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.077)	(0.109)	(0.024)	(0.115)
2018	0.022	0.070	−0.003	−0.124	−0.034	0.032
	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.069)	(0.100)	(0.025)	(0.116)
Constant	−0.903*	−0.620*	−0.480*	−0.869*	1.801*	1.562*
	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.103)	(0.168)	(0.072)	(0.168)
N	2,398	412	228	100	2,750	117
Jurisdictions	867	188	101	54	980	78
R^2	0.524	0.703	0.483	0.631	0.547	0.567
Marginal R^2	0.458	0.711	0.452	0.738	0.490	0.539
Cluster Corr. (ρ)	0.446	0.603	0.402	0.425	0.461	0.478

Note: Estimates derived from a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) with logit link function, clustering observations at the jurisdiction level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Jurisdictions* represents number of unique districts and states in each model. *Cluster Corr.* indicates mean intra-cluster correlation. * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$.

A4 Runoff Elections

As noted in the main text, runoffs are an intra-party contest, and thus the matchup is always between co-partisans. In most congressional runoffs from 2006-2018, the individual winning the most votes in the party primary also won a majority in the second round. The remaining 42 elections are enumerated in Table A8 below.

Table A8: Primary Winners, Runoff Losers 2006-2018

				Won Primary, Lost Runoff				Lost Primary, Won Runoff				CVAP			
				Name	Race	P %	R %	Name	Race	P %	R %	W%	B%	L%	**Party**
2014	AL	6	Rep.	DeMarco	W	32.7	36.5	Palmer	W	19.7	63.5	81.7	14.4	1.6	R+27
2010	AR	1	Dem.	Wooldridge	W	38.4	48.5	Causey	W	27.0	51.5	82.0	15.3	1.2	R+15
2008	GA	SEN	Dem.	Jones	B	40.4	40.1	Martin	W	34.4	59.9	63.6	30.6	3.0	R+6
2014	GA	1	Dem.	Tavio	W	34.0	36.9	Reese	B	33.8	63.1	64.0	29.3	3.7	R+8
2012	GA	2	Rep.	Allen	W	41.9	45.0	House	W	31.9	55.0	45.3	50.5	2.4	D+7
2016	GA	3	Rep.	Crane	W	26.9	46.1	Ferguson	W	26.8	53.9	69.2	24.4	3.5	R+17
2006	GA	4	Dem.	McKinney	B	47.1	41.2	Johnson	B	44.4	58.8	34.3	58.9	3.3	D+23
2014	MS	SEN	Rep.	McDaniel	W	49.5	49.0	Cochran	W	49.0	51.0	60.5	36.4	1.6	R+8
2008	MS	1	Rep.	McCullough	W	38.9	49.2	Davis	W	36.8	50.8	72.1	25.7	1.0	R+16
2010	MS	2	Rep.	Cook	W	34.8	41.6	Marcy	B	34.8	58.4	33.8	64.5	0.9	D+12
2008	MS	3	Rep.	Ross	W	33.4	43.0	Harper	W	28.3	57.0	64.4	33.2	0.9	R+16
2014	NC	6	Rep.	Berger	W	34.3	40.1	Walker	W	25.2	59.9	75.9	18.4	3.0	R+10
2010	NC	8	Rep.	D'Annunzio	W	36.9	39.0	Johnson	W	33.1	61.0	62.2	28.7	4.3	R+1
2010	NC	12	Rep.	Cumbie	W	39.5	48.3	Dority	W	34.3	51.7	46.3	46.9	3.1	D+17
2014	OK	5	Dem.	Guild	W	42.1	45.8	McAffrey	W	30.9	54.2	68.8	14.0	6.5	R+11
2006	SC	1	Dem.	Frasier	B	47.5	43.9	Maatta	W	31.6	56.1	77.2	19.2	1.4	R+10
2010	SC	3	Rep.	Cash	W	25.3	48.5	Duncan	W	23.1	51.5	77.8	18.9	1.8	R+18
2018	SC	4	Dem.	Turner	W	29.5	38.0	Brown	B	28.5	62.1	73.2	18.7	3.7	R+15
2018	SC	4	Rep.	Bright	W	24.9	45.7	Timmons	W	19.2	54.3	73.2	18.7	3.7	R+15
2012	SC	7	Rep.	Bauer	W	32.1	43.9	Rice	W	27.4	56.1	68.1	28.6	1.6	R+7
2012	TX	SEN	Rep.	Dewhurst	W	44.6	43.2	Cruz	L	34.2	56.8	55.0	13.5	27.5	R+10
2018	TX	2	Rep.	Roberts	W	33.0	30.2	Crenshaw	W	27.4	69.8	55.7	13.5	22.8	R+6
2014	TX	4	Rep.	Hall	W	45.4	47.2	Ratcliffe	W	28.8	52.8	79.5	10.6	7.0	R+27
2012	TX	7	Dem.	Squiers	W	39.9	42.1	Cargas	W	33.8	57.9	57.7	13.8	18.6	R+13
2010	TX	15	Rep.	Haring	W	41.8	43.2	Zamora	L	32.5	56.8	22.7	2.2	74.0	D+6
2012	TX	15	Rep.	Zamora	L	33.1	42.7	Brueggemann	W	31.7	57.3	23.8	2.5	72.0	D+6
2016	TX	19	Rep.	Robertson	W	26.8	46.3	Arrington	W	25.9	53.7	60.9	6.2	30.4	R+27
2018	TX	21	Dem.	Wilson	W	30.9	42.1	Kopser	W	29.0	57.9	66.7	3.8	25.2	R+6
2008	TX	22	Rep.	Sekula Gibbs	W	29.7	31.5	Olson	W	20.7	68.5	56.3	14.1	19.0	R+12
2010	TX	23	Rep.	Hurd	B	33.7	47.4	Canseco	L	32.2	52.6	34.2	3.3	59.8	R+2
2012	TX	23	Dem.	Rodriguez	L	46.0	45.2	Gallego	L	40.8	54.8	32.4	3.6	61.8	R+3
2018	TX	25	Dem.	Perri	W	32.8	47.8	Oliver	W	26.4	52.2	72.1	8.1	15.3	R+9
2010	TX	27	Rep.	Duerr	W	32.4	48.7	Farenthold	W	30.1	51.3	30.0	2.7	65.8	R+0
2012	TX	27	Dem.	Trevino	L	39.8	39.4	Harrison	L	30.7	60.6	48.2	5.7	44.1	R+13
2018	TX	27	Dem.	Barrera	L	41.2	38.1	Holguin	L	23.3	61.9	44.3	5.9	47.4	R+13
2018	TX	27	Rep.	Bruun	W	36.1	39.0	Cloud	W	33.8	61.0	44.3	5.9	47.4	R+13
2012	TX	34	Rep.	Garza	L	36.3	44.7	Bradshaw	L	34.6	55.3	21.0	1.9	76.4	D+9
2012	TX	36	Rep.	Takach	W	22.4	44.7	Stockman	W	21.8	55.3	72.9	10.1	13.9	R+26

In nine of these elections, the runoff pitted a minority primary candidate against a White candidate. In five contests, the candidate from the ethnic group composing a ma-

jority of the jurisdiction won the runoff, even when they did not win a plurality of the votes in the primary election. The four exceptions, however, may suggest the limits of candidate race in predicting victory even in primary elections. Texas's 2012 Republican Senatorial Runoff between David Dewhurst and Ted Cruz saw Cruz emerge victorious despite Texas having a Latinx citizen voting-age population under 28%. Cruz's victory was fueled in part by out-of-state endorsements and support, with the knowledge that the Republican nominee would almost certainly win office given prevailing partisanship in Texas. In TX-15, 2010 Republican nominee Eddie Zamora lost the 2012 runoff to Dale Brueggemann, despite a Latinx population over 71%. Zamora admitted to a felony conviction and five-year imprisonment, which combined with his failure to win office in 2010 likely hurt his chances in the runoff and produced an opening for political newcomer Brueggemann. Finally, in GA-1's 2014 election, Black Democrat Brian Reese defeated White Democrat Amy Tavio handily in the runoff, despite Tavio gaining a narrow plurality in the first round as African-American voters were almost evenly split between two Black candidates in a 30% Black district.

References

Gardiner, Joseph C., Zhehui Luo and Lee Ann Roman. 2009. "Fixed Effects, Random Effects and GEE: What are the Differences?" *Statistics In Medicine* 28(2):221–239.

Liang, Kung-Yee and Scott L. Zeger. 1986. "Longitudinal Data Analysis Using Generalized Linear Models." *Biometrika* 73(1):13–22.

Lien, Pei-Te, Christian Collet, Janelle Wong and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan. 2001. "Asian Pacific-American Public Opinion and Political Participation." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34:625–630.

Ong, Paul M. and Don T. Nakanishi. 2003. "Becoming Citizens, Becoming Voters: The Naturalization and Political Participation of Asian Pacific Immigrants". In *Asian Amer-*

ican Politics, Law, Participation and Policy., ed. Don T. Nakanishi and James S. Lai. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield pp. 113–133.

Ramakrishnan, Karthick, Jane Junn, Taeku Lee and Janelle. Wong. 2008. *National Asian American Survey, 2008.* Information available online at http://www.naasurvey.com.

Zorn, Christopher. 2006. "Comparing GEE and Robust Standard Errors for Conditionally Dependent Data." *Political Research Quarterly* 59(3):329.